The Conservative's Conservative: "It Didn't Work"

William F. Buckley: "It Didn't Work"

William F. Buckley, Editor at Large for the National Review, long considered the "conservative's conservative" and one of the foremost conservative intellectuals of our time has publicly announced that the strategy for Iraq--and essentially the entire thought behind the Bush Doctrine--doesn't work.

"One can't doubt that the American objective in Iraq has failed. The same edition of the paper quotes a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Reuel Marc Gerecht backed the American intervention. He now speaks of the bombing of the especially sacred Shiite mosque in Samara and what that has precipitated in the way of revenge. He concludes that 'The bombing has completely demolished' what was being attempted — to bring Sunnis into the defense and interior ministries."

Not only has Buckley seen the "writing on the walls," but also analysts and scholars from the conservative think tank, American Enterprise Institute. The claims offered by the Bush administration that democracy is working in Iraq are countered by the reality that the entire Iraqi population is marching toward three distinct visions of nationalism and/or theocracy. Iraq is on the brink of an all-out civl war based on external interventions--great and small--that ultimately had nothing to do with terrorism, threat to international security, threat to the standing of Islam in the world or threat to the interests of the United States.

"Our mission has failed because Iraqi animosities have proved uncontainable by an invading army of 130,000 Americans. The great human reserves that call for civil life haven't proved strong enough. No doubt they are latently there, but they have not been able to contend against the ice men who move about in the shadows with bombs and grenades and pistols.

The Iraqis we hear about are first indignant, and then infuriated, that Americans aren't on the scene to protect them and to punish the aggressors. And so they join the clothing merchant who says that everything is the fault of the Americans.

The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, elucidates on the complaint against Americans. It is not only that the invaders are American, it is that they are "Zionists." It would not be surprising to learn from an anonymously cited American soldier that he can understand why Saddam Hussein was needed to keep the Sunnis and the Shiites from each others' throats."

It is surprising to see someone of Buckley's intellect boil things down to the idea that an "iron hand" was needed to keep Iraq from falling apart. But that is what he seems to be implying here. However, had the Bush administration really tried to understand the conflicts, relationships and religious manifestations in Iraq, they could have arrived at this very same conclusion before the invasion began.

The history of the region is one where European force was used to create countries by draw lines on a piece of paper in places where nomadic travel and intricate tribal allegiances were the norm. The Saudi kingdom was formed out of conflict and an ability to garner support through the endorsement of conservative Wahabbi clerics that united tribes through a particular brand of Islam. The Al-Khalifa clan was able to do the same for a small archipelago on the eastern shores of the Saudi kingdom, with the help of European and Saudi support. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and even Iraq were all formed in the same manner: the emergence of strong leadership involving force, inter-tribal alliances and European influences involving Portugal, France and the British. Indeed, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and the borders with other states were basically developed the same way.

In Iraq there are three major divisive factors, hundreds of regional and tribal identities, religious allegiances, and very little in the way of a history of dealing with western style democracy... and yet, that is what the Bush Doctrine calls for... the imposition of a western style democratic government. In a culture accustomed to hierachical leadership and the custom of "majlis" (seeking counsel from a sheik or group of sheiks that hold higher position), the idea of "one person, one vote" is foreign and not in keeping with the teachings of the Koran.

"A problem for American policymakers — for President Bush, ultimately — is to cope with the postulates and decide how to proceed.

One of these postulates, from the beginning, was that the Iraqi people, whatever their tribal differences, would suspend internal divisions in order to get on with life in a political structure that guaranteed them religious freedom.

The accompanying postulate was that the invading American army would succeed in training Iraqi soldiers and policymkers to cope with insurgents bent on violence.

This last did not happen. And the administration has, now, to cope with failure. It can defend itself historically, standing by the inherent reasonableness of the postulates. After all, they govern our policies in Latin America, in Africa, and in much of Asia. The failure in Iraq does not force us to generalize that violence and antidemocratic movements always prevail. It does call on us to adjust to the question, What do we do when we see that the postulates do not prevail — in the absence of interventionist measures (we used these against Hirohito and Hitler) which we simply are not prepared to take? It is healthier for the disillusioned American to concede that in one theater in the Mideast, the postulates didn't work. The alternative would be to abandon the postulates. To do that would be to register a kind of philosophical despair. The killer insurgents are not entitled to blow up the shrine of American idealism."

But none of the ultra-conservatives or the "already convinced" members of the administration would listen to the counsel of experts that have studied the region and its dynamics. In my view, the Bush plan was doomed to fail ab initio.

"Mr. Bush has a very difficult internal problem here because to make the kind of concession that is strategically appropriate requires a mitigation of policies he has several times affirmed in high-flown pronouncements. His challenge is to persuade himself that he can submit to a historical reality without forswearing basic commitments in foreign policy."

Bush also has an internal problem at home as well. There are lessons from Vietnam regarding truthfulness in government and manner in which PR spin presents issues that should have been applied. The Bush camp seems to have ignored the history of that era as well, including the internal domestic spying, the misleading of the public, the wrongful justification of bad policy and the death of troops in an unjustfied manner (i.e. not having the right equipment).

"He will certainly face the current development as military leaders are expected to do: They are called upon to acknowledge a tactical setback, but to insist on the survival of strategic policies. Yes, but within their own counsels, different plans have to be made. And the kernel here is the acknowledgment of defeat."

It is here that a lesson from Tom Peters' "In Search of Excellence" and "Thriving On Chaos" should be heeded. When a policy, practice or plan is not effective, "learn to fail quickly" so that you can change direction and implement a new plan, a new direction and hope for new results. But the entrenchment of the Bush administration is committed to a course of action that is not bearing fruit.

Someone once said the definition of insanity is repeating the exact same behaviors that failed every time it was tried before, but expecting different results this time. Continuing down the current path is insanity by that definition.