The Confusion Over Iraq, The Middle East & The ISG

My writings and blog posts on the matters involving Iraq (and to some extent, Afghanistan) have focused on how Bush, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld (and now his successor) and the whole of the decision-making body of GOP leadership have not bothered to understand the cultural, political and geographical issues that confront all concerned with the future of Iraq, the Middle East, the Arabian Penninsula and the Indian sub-continent.

Several stories of late have emphasized--and affirmed--that my position on these matters is correct... at least more correct than anything State, DOD, the Pentagon, the Oval Office, the West Wing or the GOP-controlled congress has been since this whole shebang began.

The first and foremost story has been the release of the findings of the Iraq Study Group (ISG). Of course every pundit, analyst and know-it-all has been producing commentary, often in a panel, on how the ISG got it right, got it wrong, the plan in Iraq needs to change, and President Bush needs to get onboard with the change in direction.

President Bush, of course, has refused to give immediate consideration to anything the ISG has offered. He has argued that he is looking for more input on the matters and will not consider the ISG report alone. Given the nature of the panel, the credentials of the panel members, the reputation of the panel members, as well as the fact that the report is grounded in some form of reality that George W. Bush has lost touch with once he took the oath of office for POTUS, it is pretty damn arrogant, ignorant and unreasonable for Bush to take the position he has embraced in the press.

At first Bush only wanted some time to "digest" the findings of the ISG and the recommendations offered in the report. The initial delay was to be a few more days, but definitely released before Christmas. Some spin doctors must have been whispering in Goergie's ear because the release of the Bush response to the ISG report is now delayed until sometime in January. For my part, I am willing to bet there will be at least one more postponement (read: "delay" or "procrastination" and "PR campaign preparation") before the "Bush ISG Response" (BISGR) becomes real. My money is on the fact that the State of the Union (SOU) is not too far away and Bush is looking for a headline grabbing performance during the SOU address. Bush, on the advice of people like Karl Rove, will use the initial BISGR releases as a stepping stone toward a "big finish" in front of congress and television cameras reaching into millions of American homes.

But I am not fooled. Bush is claiming he is "digesting" the ISG report. That line of bovine excrement stinks from Crawford to DC. What he is doing is looking for a way to dispute the ISG findings and "prove"--by way of his own perverse international relations logic--that his "stay the course" arguments and actions are still the best policy no matter what the American public says (by way of the interim election) or what this panel of distinguished, learned and experienced leaders has to say.

However, there are some issues that Bush could make some legitimate points about in terms of the ISG. Bush will not capitalize on these points because it would expose him and his foreign policy approach to even more criticism and ridicule. The first area of criticism that can be leveled against the ISG report is the utter lack of the cultural issues involved not only in Iraq proper, but throughout the Middle East, the Arabian Penninsula and the Indian sub-continent. None of the ISG panel members were sufficiently familiar or experienced with the culture of Iraq, its surrounding nations, or the Arab/Muslim mindset. Certainly all of the panel had more than enough insight into the international arena of dealing with the Middle East, but none of them had any on-the-ground experience dealing with shop keepers of the various parts of the Souk (open marketplaces in the various parts of the cities, towns and villages), vendors wandering through the streets to provide "sweet water" (potable water), the street corner bakery that prepares various flatbreads every day, or even how the local imam or sheik influences the local people. Still not addressed in the ISG, or anything the Bush administration has done to date, is the basic problem of how Arab-Muslim society functions.

Arabs have long held to a tradition of having a "majlis" (council of elders) way of resolving community matters. The majlis is usually headed by a family or tribal elder, advised by a respected imam (regardless of what clerical ranking), and counseled by respected influential members of the community. Although in an American or western view, there seems to be a lot of influence peddling, putting on of airs, power brokering and personality cult building in the majlis process, the reality is that this is the culturally acceptable way of dealing with community problems.

One of the reasons the Iraqi provisional government and the current Iraqi government has failed to be effective is because a western approach to elections was implemented from the outside. The entire government-building process ignored the majlis cultural norm, neglected the local process and needs of the people in their own communities, and wiped aside the entire process that allows Iraqi Arab Muslims to come to terms with change.

Instead, in the void and vaccum created by the sheer incompetence of the post invasion plan, those that have been seeking political and military power for decades under the Baathists and Hussein regime have girded their loins and built militias to enforce their will and vision of the next evolution of Iraqi existence.

The next area that the ISG ignored is the military (and police) realities. No one on the ISG panel had significant military experience, especially in terms of training troops; maintaining troops; dealing with ethnic, racial and religious conflicts within the ranks of the military; class and status issues in the military (a big deal in Arab countries); the influence of the leaders of the various militias; and the issues of underlying loyalties within the ranks of the military and police. While the ISG report calls for increased training, and advisory roles for US and coalition forces, it largely ignores the inherent and exigent realities that there are no cohesive groups within the police and military structures in Iraq. One military or police unit is as likely to gun down another unit as it is to enforce a curfew. Hell, there might even be IEDs used to attack members within a unit who have a minority status within that unit (i.e. Kurds in a largely Arab unit; Sunnis in a largely Shi'ite unit; or vice versa). None of the ISG panel was prepared, experienced or able to confront those realities in anything but an abstract manner, so it did not get full coverage in the ISG report.

Another area largely ignored in the ISG report is the economic details of Iraq. In all but the most untouched areas of Iraq, the main economic realities is providing the basics of life. I am reminded of the scene in the movie, "El Cid," where Valencia is under seige by forces loyal to Christian Spain and about to fall. The Muslim leader of the city, who is entrenched in his views and militancy, refuses to surrender and forces hardship upon hardship upon the people. Instead of pushing an attack and breaking down the walls to finish off the Muslim forces within the walls, El Cid catapaults bread and other foods into the city. Of course, the people that have suffered within the city, and have been almost starved during the siege, revolt against the Muslim leader and his forces within the city. El Cid understood the needs of the local people. That led to the winning of the battle for Valencia.

The needs of the Iraqi people remain largely unmet. The rebuilding efforts operated and funded by the US have been almost for nought. The amount of fraud, corruption, waste and theft of money, supplies, equipment and resources that has accompanied the "aid" provided to Iraq has been phenomenal. The fact remains that the average Iraqi doesn't have running water, electricity, garbage pick up, ordinary health care, access to fresh food on a regular basis, and has no means to change these realities. The economic needs of the average Iraqi has been ignored in favor of building military structures, secure buildings for high-mucky-mucks, and lining the pockets of corporations like Halliburton, KBR and their counterparts from around the world.

Large sums of oil money is laying about not being used for the benefit of Iraqi people. The occupation of Iraq is not only seen as wrong from religious grounds--as is argued by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda commentators--but also moral and political grounds. None of the Iraqis interviewed today would offer the opinion that they are better off today than they were before the invasion. The late, great Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, quipped, "All politics is local." The Bush administration, the old guard GOP congress critters, the new guard Democrat congress critters and the ISG could learn a lot just by repeating Tip's words once daily.

But what really frosts my cookies is the entrenchment that President Bush is engaging in at the moment. He is so egocentric in his notion of leadership that he refuses to hear what others have to say if it conflicts with his "stay the course" rhetoric. Of course, I am not the only one to note the attempts for a PR spin or the entrenchment.

Without Deliberate Speed

We are more than eager for this White House to finally get something right on Iraq. But we find it chilling to imagine that Mr. Bush and his advisers have only now begun a full policy review, months after Iraq plunged into civil war and years after experts began warning that the administration’s strategy was not working.

We would like to believe that the reason for delay is that some of Mr. Bush’s advisers have come up with a sensible change in course and they are now trying to persuade the president to take it. Or that behind the scenes Mr. Bush is already strong-arming Iraq’s leaders to rein in the sectarian militias and begin long-delayed national reconciliation talks.

We fear that a more likely explanation is that the president’s ever-divided policy advisers are still wrangling over the most basic decisions, while his political handlers are waiting for public enthusiasm for the Baker report to flag before Mr. Bush tries to explain why he won’t follow through on some of the report’s most important and reasonable suggestions — like imposing a timetable on Iraqi leaders to make political compromises or face a withdrawal of American support. Or trying to persuade Iran and Syria to cease their meddling.

Then, too, is the apparent idiocy of relying upon Iran and Syria proposed by Bush supporters and the ISG. Inviting wolves into the hen house to protect the chickens from foxes is never a wise idea. While the foxes will avoid the hen house, we will lose the chickens, and run the risk of being eaten alive by the wolves as well.

But recent reports indicate that we cannot rely upon those Middle Eastern nations that have a stake in supporting stability in Iraq. The Saudis, for instance, recognizing the threat to their Kingdom posed by Shi'ites more aligned with Iran and Syria, have a semi-sorta-kinda pledge to support the Sunnis in Iraq:

Saudis Say They Might Back Sunnis If U.S. Leaves Iraq

Saudi Arabia has told the Bush administration that it might provide financial backing to Iraqi Sunnis in any war against Iraq’s Shiites if the United States pulls its troops out of Iraq, according to American and Arab diplomats.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia conveyed that message to Vice President Dick Cheney two weeks ago during Mr. Cheney’s whirlwind visit to Riyadh, the officials said. During the visit, King Abdullah also expressed strong opposition to diplomatic talks between the United States and Iran, and pushed for Washington to encourage the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, senior Bush administration officials said.

While I know the Saud family to be almost entirely focused on its own self-interests, it isn't a far-fetched notion that engaging Iran, and for that matter, Syria, is not in the interest of any Middle Eastern nation. Neither, however, is leaving Iraq in the chaos we have created.

The Saudi warning reflects fears among America’s Sunni Arab allies about Iran’s rising influence in Iraq, coupled with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. King Abdullah II of Jordan has also expressed concern about rising Shiite influence, and about the prospect that the Shiite-dominated government would use Iraqi troops against the Sunni population.

The recent hosting of an anti-Holocaust conference by the president of Iran, piled on top of its nuclear threat, its support of militant Islamic extremists, and the close ties with internal Iraqi militants like Al-Sadr are more than adequate proof that working with Iran is unwise, not only from a US perspective, but from international and Middle Eastern perspectives as well. Even though the real power in Iran is held by the top ayatollah--and the council of ayatollahs, mullahs and imams that advises him--the fact that such extremists like the Iranian president are allowed to hold leadership positions in Iran is at least disconcerting... if not evidence that the entire leadership is in question.

A senior Bush administration official said Tuesday that part of the administration’s review of Iraq policy involved the question of how to harness a coalition of moderate Iraqi Sunnis with centrist Shiites to back the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

The problem is that al-Maliki is significantly aligned with al-Sadr and the militant Shi'ite elements that support al-Sadr.

The Saudis have argued strenuously against an American pullout from Iraq, citing fears that Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab population would be massacred. Those fears, United States officials said, have become more pronounced as a growing chorus in Washington has advocated a draw-down of American troops in Iraq, coupled with diplomatic outreach to Iran, which is largely Shiite.

Translation: The Saudis don't want to spend their resources and extend their military to contain the Iraqi civil war that is currently underway, despite the denials offered by the Bush administration. Once again the self-interests of the Saudis--a culturally relative ethical position for the Kingdom and an ethical egoism position for the King and his relatives holding high office--emerge as paramount for the Saudis.

The Bush administration is also working on a way to form a coalition of Sunni Arab nations and a moderate Shiite government in Iraq, along with the United States and Europe, to stand against “Iran, Syria and the terrorists,” another senior administration official said Tuesday.

Is there such a thing as a "moderate Shiite government"? While there may be moderate Shi'ite leaders, and some countries with moderate policies, I doubt very much that such an animal lives and breathes within a 4000 miles of Mecca. Once again the ignorance of the culture and underlying realities surface from within the Bush administration and the whole of US international policy in the Middle East.

Until now Saudi officials have promised their counterparts in the United States that they would refrain from aiding Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. But that pledge holds only as long as the United States remains in Iraq.

This amounts to nothing less than a veiled threat and nothing more than outright manipulation of US foreign policy... and as usual, in support of Saudi self-interests.

The Saudis have been wary of supporting Sunnis in Iraq because their insurgency there has been led by extremists of Al Qaeda, who are opposed to the kingdom’s monarchy. But if Iraq’s sectarian war worsened, the Saudis would line up with Sunni tribal leaders.

The only thing more concerning than having extreme Sunnis in control over in Iraq would be having extreme Shi'ites in control. The vast majority of militants coming out of, or protesting within, the Saudi Kingdom are disenfranchised or disillusioned Shi'ites. Dissident Shi'ites within Saudi Arabia live in the Eastern, Northeastern and Southern provinces of the Kingdom. Those in the south have contacts in Yemen, as well as receiving "instigator funds" from Syria. The Shi'ites in the east and northeast have ties with Iran, radicals emerging in Kuwait, Bahrain and southern Iraq. While the vast majority of Sunnis in Saudia are pro-Saud, the majority of Shi'ites are less than supportive of the King and his family. One of the factors maintaining a modicum of control in Saudia is the fact that the Saud Family has adopted Wahabbiism, which shares a lot of the values expressed in the Shi'ite traditions.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) has released a report that addresses a few more of the issues I have raised, but it, too, seems to ignore a lot of the substance that needs to be addressed. However, this report focuses on the "war on terrorism" rather than just on the occupation of Iraq.

Rethinking the War on Terrorism: The Lessons of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Five years into the war on terrorism, Americans find themselves searching for new ideas and strategies. PPI Foreign Policy Fellow Kevin Croke proposes a new paradigm for understanding the conflict -- the war on terror as counterinsurgency. In this paper, Croke outlines key tenets of counterinsurgency theory and how they apply to the war on terror.

Winning Hearts and Minds

The most important task of counterinsurgency is to separate insurgents from their base of popular support. For the war on terrorism, counterinsurgency theory suggests the following principles:

# Use measured force. Unless it can be carefully targeted, use of conventional military power against non-state groups will backfire;

# Hold the moral high ground. Abusive interrogation techniques or unlimited extralegal detention are counterproductive at the strategic level;

# Support political reform. A patient, multilateral strategy of support for indigenous political reform is the best way to repair America's image in the Muslim world;

# Pay attention to soft power. The US also needs to use the neglected tools of soft power, such as economic aid, trade preferences, diplomatic leverage, public diplomacy, and the attractive power of American ideals.

Targeting the Enemy

To target the hard core of jihadists, intelligence is key. This means that the U.S. must:

# Prioritize intelligence and police work. Day-to-day counterterrorism is mostly police and intelligence work, which means that continued intelligence reform is critical;

# Build anti-terrorism coalitions. Breaking up terror plots requires the cooperation of foreign authorities, so good international working relationships must be a top priority;

# Avoid civil liberties absolutism. The primacy of police and intelligence work means that Americans will have to make new tradeoffs between security and civil liberties;

# Invest in area and language knowledge. Counterinsurgents need to have an intimate knowledge of the language, culture, and history of the host population.

Supporting Reform

Counterinsurgency doctrine stresses the need for reforms that undercut popular support for insurgency:

# Promote political and economic modernization. The US needs to fight the root cause of extremism -- the Middle East's lagging economic, political, and social development;

# Divide the enemy. The US should seek opportunities to exploit internal divisions among jihadist groups;

# Help Europe integrate its Muslims. The susceptibility of some European Muslims to extremist ideology means that better integration policies are critical.

I am not sure that this approach would be all that effective in any case because its primary focus remains a "divide and conquer" effort rather than seeking a real resolution that the average Iraqi, regardless of sectarian or ethnic identity, could live with.

We are fond of saying that "history repeats itself." Ordinarily this saying applies to long-term history rather than the immediate circumstances. Unfortunately, the practice of ignoring the culture and the on-the-ground realities is producing similar results in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Support for Militants Threatens Region, Karzai Says

“In Afghanistan we are fighting the symptoms of terrorism, not the roots of it,” he added. “We feel we should go to the sources of terrorism and fight it there, or we’ll keep losing men, Afghan and international, in a vicious circle.”

The charge that Pakistan is supporting extremists to destabilize Afghanistan is an old and contentious one between the nations. The Pakistani intelligence agency has long used Islamic militant groups as a tool to press rival governments in Afghanistan and India.

Today Pakistan says it has ceased that support, though evidence is mounting that hundreds of suicide bombers and other militants — from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia — are being recruited and trained in Pakistan’s tribal areas along the Afghan border. Al Qaeda commanders, including possibly Osama bin Laden, are believed to be taking shelter in the area.

While this article focuses mostly on the issues of support for Taliban and Al-Qaeda coming out of Pakistan, other articles have discussed the problems associated with tribal war lords, drug kingpins and the never before seen bumper crops of opium. The dynamics of coporate rip-offs of US tax dollars, failed and/or ineffective projects, as well as a number of US troops involved in scandalous behaviors, not to mention the number of deaths in Afghanistan that go largely unreported in our media.

Mr. Karzai also criticized NATO for the behavior of some of its troops, who have fired on civilians in the aftermath of suicide attacks on their convoys. British troops caused particular anger in this city on Dec. 3, when they fired repeatedly on civilians after their supply convoy was hit, killing two and wounding five.

“After all, they are here to fight terrorism and bring protection to the Afghan people,” Mr. Karzai said at a news conference, referring to the NATO troops. “We are extremely worried — it hurts us, it hurts Afghan civilians. We are worried by it, and NATO is also worried by it, and we are working together to reduce such casualties.”

Mr. Karzai convened senior ministers, ambassadors and NATO and American generals in Kandahar to address some of the most urgent issues facing the southern provinces, which have been racked by violence this year. The meeting, known as the Policy Action Group, addressed ways to enhance security and NATO’s handling of the insurgency since it took over from the United States in the south in August.

It appears that its the "same old, same old" thing in Afghanistan as it is in Iraq. The question of whether or not life has improved in Afghanistan since the invasion might yield a few more positive responses, but the average Afghani is not living what anyone of sound mind and spirit would consider a "good life." Many of the mistakes being made in Iraq are also being made in Afghanistan... by the same people... including Mr. Bush and gang.

It seems to me that someone ought to hand Bush a shovel so that he can clear a lot of the bovine excrement he has been accumulating out of the hole he has been digging in the Middle East.