A Combat Zone Forgotten

A Separate Peace

Every day we hear something about Iraq. Occasionally, we hear something about Afghanistan. Even less occasionally we hear something about Somalia. The movement of naval vessels are covered as well. But it is seldom that we hear anything about Kosovo, Serbia, Albania and other nations that emerged after the break-up of Soviet bloc affiliates.

But we still have troops on the ground over there as advisers, technicians, and peace enforcement under the NATO banner. We seem to have lost touch with the troops "over there" because we are no longer interested in the affairs of these nations and we do not have a lot of dead soldiers coming home. Then, too, there is little to nothing that can cause a sensational enough of a stir that it would actually sell papers and call people to tune into the next report.

So we have a forgotten zone of conflict and combat.

JUST a few years ago, there was guarded optimism about Kosovo’s future. Checkpoints were dismantled; the process to establish governance standards was under way. But that was before the communal riots in 2004, and before Albanians’ and Serbs’ incompatible visions for Kosovo led to deadlock last year in talks over the province’s final status. And so now, more than seven years after NATO ended Serbia’s brutal dominion over the province, the international community is about to impose a solution.

Too bad it’s the wrong one. The likely plan gives too little to Albanians and takes too much from Serbs. But there’s an alternative, if only the international community would consider it: partition. Flexibility on borders could make a fully independent Kosovo easier to govern, provide more protection for minorities and make a negotiated deal attainable. Partition is possible, and possibly the right thing to do.

Yet every proposal assumes partition must be ruled out. The United Nations plan, due to be presented Friday to the Serbian and Kosovo governments but whose details leaked last week, follows the conventional wisdom. It offers a half-state on the whole territory: Kosovo will get most of the powers of a sovereign state without full independence, and with no revision of its borders. But that combination is unacceptable to Albanians and Serbs: Albanians suffered horribly under Serbian rule and deserve full independence, yet any separate status for Kosovo poses a threat to non-Albanian minorities there.

The international community’s all-Kosovo fixation has forced it to concoct complex power-sharing schemes to accommodate two mistrustful populations before considering independence. The costs of this ‘‘standards before status’’ approach have been predictable: an uncertain investment environment, frustrated expectations and a fragility that destabilizes the region.

It would be one thing if these mutually suspicious populations were inextricably linked, but they aren’t. The majority of Serbs in Kosovo live in a small strip in the far north. Partition would allow them to continue living in Serbia. The remaining pockets would be less threatening to Albanians, making Kosovo more governable, and the small, remaining Serbian population safer.

Partition could break the negotiating deadlock. The Albanian leadership in Pristina might give up the Serb-populated north in exchange for immediate recognition and streamlined governance without international supervision. And Serbia might relax its resistance to Kosovo’s independence if it could retain the northern bit — which would ease international approval, since Russia has vowed to veto any plan that Serbia doesn’t accept.