Ending DPW Deal Still Leaves Holes In National Security

Overseas Firms Entrenched in Ports: Despite Dubai Company's Withdrawal, Others Are Likely to Stay Put

The decision by Dubai Ports World to abandon its effort to take over terminal operations at six U.S. seaports was a victory for the numerous politicians who have thundered in recent days that foreign companies have no business handling U.S. port operations.

But foreign firms remain deeply embedded in nearly every major port in the country. And transferring ownership of those operations to U.S. companies could cause serious problems in an industry in which nearly all of the shipping is controlled by foreign interests. An immense amount of capital from those foreigners will be required to expand the nation's port system in coming years as global commerce continues to burgeon.

Global commerce is an important part of our economy. Competing in a global economy means having ports and shipping capability that allow international ships to dock, load and unload. But being "open for business" does not have to mean being open to security risks.

While President Bush has spoken out against quashing the DPW deal, he seems to have forgotten his own words and ideas on national security. We are spending billions of hard-earned tax dollars on making Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and other places "secure for freedom and democracy," but our official policy seems to be that we will forego our own internal security because it's good for business. There is an asinine logic at work here. We cannot be safe and secure in our own country when we continue to leave the security of the entry and exit points of our borders essential unguarded and operated by entities that have no vested interest in our best interests.

Certainly, as one federal official stated this past week, the entities doing business in, out and on our ports have a vested interest in making a profit. However, as many of our own organized criminals have demonstrated over many years, there is profit in chaos, arson, arms deals, and smuggling. The business interest will only cover the vested interests to a certain point. A business can insure its operations and cover its losses... and then fold up and move on. We cannot fold up our borders and ignore our own security. We cannot allow the businesses--especially foreign-owned businesses, and even more so those owned by foreign governments--to manage national security interests.

For an example of the industry's international nature, consider Inchcape Shipping Services, a London-based company that provides ship agency services -- arranging the smooth arrival and departure of vessels -- at 200 ports around the world, including more than two dozen in the United States. Inchcape was purchased in January by a Dubai company whose chief executive, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, also heads Dubai Ports World.

No offense intended toward the amir of any of the Gulf Arab States, but no one from outside of the United States can assure our security. Our congress needs to pass some serious legislation that increases the security at our ports, reviews ownership of the companies that run these operations, prohibits ownership/operation by any foreign government or its wholly-owned companies, and restricts military contracts to US-owned businesses that are inherently and entirely subject to US laws regarding national security. We also need law that places the security of port installations entirely under federal jurisdiction, compels the use of federal officers for security, increases the training and technology for security personnel, and passes some of the costs for that security to the businesses that manage, operate and profit from those ports.

Some time ago I wrote about layering security as being an effective methodology for assuring effectiveness of a security plan. The first rule of security, however, is maintaining control and access of the assets being protected. When we allow foreigners to maintain control and access to our ports, we are violating that first rule.

Besides, the development of our own port security systems will increase the number of jobs Bush and the Republican controlled congress can claim during the next election.

Or consider Maersk, a Danish shipping giant. Its U.S. subsidiary operates much of the commercial fleet that serves the U.S. Navy, which means that its vessels transport items such as fuel and ammunition to U.S. military operations abroad.

Theoretically, such arrangements involve security risks. Terrorist operatives might infiltrate Inchcape or Maersk and send strategic information about ship or fleet movements to enemy forces. Many maritime security experts consider those risks small, especially compared with the lack of reliable policing at dozens of ports in poor countries that send goods to the United States.

But whatever the security ramifications, foreign ownership dominates the maritime industry, including the U.S. facilities where giant ships dock and unload thousands of containers filled with products for U.S. consumers.

Last time I checked the Danes were not known for their acts of terrorism or their lack of internal security. However, the principle remains the same: foreigners never have enough vested interest in our national security. We should allow foreign corporations to operate shipping and commerce through our ports. But our ports should remain OUR ports.

While we're discussing these issues, let us add that foreign corporations should not receive contract awards for producing military weapons, ships, planes, tanks, motors, avionics, or other classified military technology. We have several government contracts with foreign corporations, including companies that are being acquired by the sovereign state of Dubai:

Lou Dobbs Tonight, 10 MAR 06: "Dubai International Capital is buying Doncasters, which operates in nine U.S. locations and makes precision parts for defense contractors, parts for military aircraft and tanks."