Maybe This Explains Our Approach To Iran?

India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell: Rice Set to Defend Landmark Accord She Orchestrated Without Congress

The last time anyone went ahead and negotitated a deal without consulting congress, the congress critters of the day sent a resounding message of "Screw You!" That was the negotiation for the League of Nations (a precursor idea to the United Nations) under the direction of President Woodrow Wilson. Congress collectively thought Wilson was too big for his own britches and shot him down... So all of the major powers of the world during that time frame were signatories to the League of Nations except the good old US of A.

Now comes the Bush gang, who think of themselves as being above congress altogether, negotiating a deal for enhanced nuclear technology and training for a nation that is as unstable as any other in that region of Asia, but is in a key geographic position between China, Pakistan and Iran. Having an actively friendly nation in that location helps sway the tide of decision-making for those countries that are either too unstable (Pakistan and Iran) or too big for their own good (China).

However, we must understand that there are some strategic reasons for agreeing to the India Nuclear Proliferation Deal:

Pakistan has an unstable political structure that cannot control certain regions of its own nation: Having a nuclear ally in the region will provide the government of Pakistan an incentive to gain more stability and control those regions known for supporting international terrorism, including Al-Qaeda;

• India and Pakistan have been fighting over certain regions between their artificially created borders, and Pakistan has had the advantage because they have been rumored to have more developed nuclear weapons and a more unstable political structure: If India has more developed nuclear weapons and US technical support, it forces Pakistan to come to the negotiation table with a more amenable attitude;


• China is the big super power in Asia with a tremendous number of foot soldiers, nuclear capability and a government that likes to posture and strut out its military capability; Having a more stabble and more capable India, complete with a huge number of foot soldiers, makes China a little more manageable;


• Iran is also an unstable nation, with an undercurrent of revolt flowing throughout the major cities, and a penchant for posturing, threatening and funding terrorist activities; Having a nuclear capable India would be likely to rein these folks in a bit and make them less likely to threaten the development and/or use of their nuclear capabilities, as well as tighten the security and inspection of nuclear programs.

But the entire deal with India completely reverses the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear power and weapons. The deal would essentially negate our own committment to most of the other powerful nations of the world that we would not take steps to spread the threat of nuclear attack, use of nuclear weapons and nuclear holocaust. Amazing how willingly we make promises and then break them at the whim of an ego-maniacal ultra-conservative president.

The deal with India is totally a wrong-headed move. Congress is absolutely correct in questioning, and resisting, the deal. The problem is that none of the GOP congress critters have the backbone to go against the flow of the ultra-conservative Christian Right base of the party that seems to be in support of Bush no matter what laws, principles or processes he decides to violate.

Let us hope, and pray, that congress has some members with big enough heuvos to stand up to the Bush gang and finally say no to idiotic international efforts. But our hopes and prayers are working on thin ice given the way the Bush gang has acted in Iraq, Palestine, Israel and elsewhere.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew into New Delhi a year ago and set in motion a revolution in U.S. policy on nuclear weapons and relations with India.

She didn't tip her hand publicly during the brief stop, sticking to bland expressions of "a new relationship" with "great potential." The outlines of her plan were known by only a handful of people in the U.S. government.

Four months later, on July 18, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved a landmark accord at the White House.

Beyond the invasion of Iraq, few of Bush's decisions have as much potential to shake the international order than his deal with India, supporters and opponents agree. The debate over the deal has pitted against each other two powerful national security goals -- the desire to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and the desire to counter the rise of China, in this case by accelerating New Delhi's ascent as a global power.

After three decades of treating India as a pariah because it used a civilian nuclear program to produce fissile material for weapons, Bush decided the United States would forgive the transgression. India would be able to buy foreign-made nuclear reactors if it opened its civilian facilities to international inspections -- while being allowed to substantially ramp up its ability to produce materials for nuclear weapons.

Previously, the administration had favored an incremental easing of the nuclear rules regarding India. This agreement, as one of Rice's aides put it, was "the big bang," designed to bring historically nonaligned India firmly into the U.S. camp. But the deal has spawned fierce controversy in Washington, in part because going forward would require Congress to change laws for the nuclear sales. Rice will defend the agreement in congressional testimony this week.

The story behind the agreement also sheds light on how foreign policy is conducted in Bush's second term. For an administration frequently criticized for not being nimble, the India deal highlights the flexibility of Rice's foreign-policy team, which has also shifted policies toward Europe, on Iran and other areas in the past year. It demonstrates how, in contrast to the first term, foreign policy is largely driven by Rice and a close circle of advisers, not the White House staff.

But the India deal also shows the drawbacks of this approach, critics say. The agreement is in trouble partly because -- in what some critics say is an echo of the Iraq invasion -- there was little consultation with Congress or within the foreign-affairs bureaucracy before it was announced. Last month in New Delhi, Bush and Singh reached agreement on how India will implement the deal. But nuclear specialists in the U.S. government say their concerns about weapons proliferation also were overridden in final talks.

Now, nuclear experts from across the political spectrum have urged Congress to modify the accord, which the administration and Indian officials say would be tantamount to killing it.